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A NEW VIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
Abner J. Mikva* 
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES. 2d ed. By Hans 
A. Linde, George Bunn, Fredericka Paff, and W. Lawrence Church. 
Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press. 1981. Pp. lxvii, 887. $24. 
There is something formidable about the blue buckram of a law 
school casebook. Perhaps it is the color that, in context, can only 
bring back haunting memories of the bluebooks that law student and 
law teacher alike learned to dread. Perhaps it is the size or the ab-
sence of adornment that make a casebook an unlikely source for in-
teresting reading. And yet for all that, Justice Linde and Professor 
Bunn have, not once but twice - this time with the assistance of 
Professors Fredericka Paff and W. Lawrence Church - produced a 
law textbook that reads well. 
Part of the credit must go to the subject matter. The legislative 
process is, after all, politics. Compared with the effort demanded in 
mastering the Rule in Shelly's Case or the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, learning about the political processes in law school is a pleasant 
change of pace. Even when the legislative process is combined with 
the more arcane administrative processes, the subject matter is still 
choice. The need for teaching materials on how laws are made has 
been one of the chief reasons for the dearth of law school courses on 
the subject. This edition certainly fills a large portion of that gap. 
I taught the legislative process in law school shortly before the 
first edition came out, and would have used it had the authors been a 
little less dilatory in getting it on the market. The second edition is 
improved, and even a little leaner, notwithstanding four additional 
years' worth of legislative history and administrative precedent. The 
reasons for the leanness are mostly good - a sifting and winnowing 
of some of the materials from the first edition that had gone too 
deeply into subjects of interest only to the more specialized student 
of politics. For example, how Congress or the state legislatures con-
trol their own membership and proceedings is covered by the in-
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depth discussion of Powell v. McCormack, 1 thus allowing for a re-
duction of the discussion of other cases in point. (Justice Linde even 
cut down the extent of the quotations from his law review article on 
the case, an act of authorial self-abnegation not frequently encoun-
tered.)2 As a result, the quantum of material is just right for the 
teaching of the course contemplated by the authors - three credit 
hours in a good law school. 
Having so easily and favorably disposed of the physical dimen-
sions of the second edition, the dissection becomes more problemati-
cal, and its results are less likely to please the authors. First, I have 
trouble with the combination of the legislative and administrative , 
processes in one book. True, such a combination does distinguish 
this casebook from all of the competitors that continue to separate 
Congress and the state legislatures from their administrative prog-
eny.3 The distinctiveness of such an organization, however, comes at 
the expense of blurring the boundary between articles I and II of the 
United States Constitution and their counterparts in most of the 
states. Sometimes the blurring is quite mischievous, as when the in-
vestigative power of Congress and that of the federal agencies are 
meshed into a single chapter that leaves the reader and student 
somewhat bewildered about whether the fourth amendment pre-
cludes the Congress from conducting unreasonable searches and 
seizures or whether the fifth amendment protects a corporation from 
having to incriminate itself before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Sometimes the combination leads to an area that needs 
more detailed discussion than can be provided in a book that covers 
both kinds of processes, as, for instance, in the handling of the due 
process owed by administrative agencies to claimants appearing 
before them.4 Sometimes the format merely makes it more difficult 
I. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). It is difficult to talk about the Powell case without getting into a 
myriad of related subjects, as the 89 pages of Supreme Court opinions in the case attest. The 
authors do raise some of the other questions of congressional self-discipline, but they resist the 
temptation to write a book-within-a-book about the fascinating case involving the fascinating 
Adam Clayton Powell and his fascination for going to exotic places at the taxpayer's expense. 
2. The article, Comment on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 174 (1969), is one of 
the best of the innumerable pieces about the Powell case. 
3. There is no end to the "logic" of carrying through the legislative process to the "next 
step." From the administrative agencies, one gets to the courts, which review agency decisions, 
to the executive branch, which appoints the administrators, to the private sector, which has to 
cope with the legislative, administrative, and legal decisions that are promulgated. All govern-
ment and all law are intertwined, and the divisions for teaching purposes are somewhat arbi-
trary. But the alternative is one big law school course on "The Law." I am reminded that the 
late Professor William Winslow Crosskey set out to do a law review article on the constitu-
tional antecedents of the co=erce clause. He ended up with a two-volume work on the 
Constitution, with a third volume put together posthumously by one of his assistants. 
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), for instance, remains one of those enigmatic 
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to understand how Congress (and the state legislatures) have them-
selves blurred the distinction - for example, with respect to the de-
lineation between the independent regulatory agencies and those in 
the executive branch. After several courses in law school, nineteen 
years in the legislative branch, and several years on the bench, I still 
am never quite sure about all that turns on that distinction. Consid-
ering the extent of the literature on the topic, it probably asks too 
much of a casebook to cover the area while it is being used to teach 
the budding lawyer all that he or she needs to know about the legis-
lative and administrative processes of federal and state 
govemments.5 
This brings me to my second concern about the overbreadth of 
the book. I am not sure that one can cover the federal and state 
processes in the same casebook and in the same course. The authors 
acknowledge the difficulty by stressing the need for more localized 
materials to supplement their coverage of the state processes. Even 
with such supplementation, I think the task is unmanageable. A 
book could be written about the distinctions between federal 
processes and those of any one state. Any number of books could be 
written on the distinctive processes of the various states. When one 
considers the history of the uniform law commissions, for example, 
and the difficulties that they have encountered in trying to hold the 
fifty states to a set of norms even after a consensus has been reached, 
it is obviously very difficult to talk generically about how state legis-
lative bodies and administrative agencies function. It should not 
come as a surprise, therefore, to see most of the state examples com-
ing from Oregon (where Justice Linde holds forth) and Wisconsin 
(where Professor Bunn and the two new collaborators abide and 
teach). Aside from the obvious parochialism, those two states proba-
bly reflect the cream of orderly process. Woe betide the lawyer who 
walks into the Illinois General Assembly at Springfield expecting to 
precedents from which all interested parties draw comfort or concern about what procedures 
protect a government beneficiary from withdrawal of benefits. The case gets only indirect 
coverage in the text, which could lead an unwary teacher or student to underestimate its im-
portance and difficulties. 
5. Should Congress or the executive branch exercise the same degree of oversight over 
independent regulatory agencies and executive branch agencies? Should the various congres-
sional veto mechanisms over rules and regulations be coterminous for both kinds of agencies? 
These are particularly timely questions given the zeal for regulatory reform being shown on 
Capitol Hill. The book only grazes the general area of the legislative veto, and does even less 
about the "Bumpers" Amendment conundrum, concerning how much the judges should do by 
way of watching over the rule-making process. My criticism goes not to the omission of these 
questions, because inclusion of all the missing material could double the size of the book; 
rather, it faults the authors' creation of the dilemma in the first place by combining legislative 
and administrative processes in one casebook. · 
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see a replication of the Wisconsin Legislature.6 Woe unto the New 
York lawyer who expects his state's regulatory agencies to be as ar-
ticulate and even-handed as an Oregon Commission. 
Notwithstanding my complaints, I am aware that many law 
schools give such short shrift to the legislative process (and even to 
administrative law) that the practical choice is between a combina-
tion textbook such as this one and a few footnotes in a book on con-
stitutional law. Considering how much of a practicing lawyer's time 
will be spent reading and using statutes and regulations, it is distres-
sing that so little time is spent in law schools telling students how 
those statutes and regulations are made. It is almost as if our educa-
tors take too literally the old adage that legislation is like sausage: if 
one wants to enjoy the consumption, one should never watch the 
product being made. 
As long as law continues to be taught largely by the case method, 
an important measure of a teaching tool is how it handles cases. The 
authors get high marks on that score. The acknowledged difficulty 
with using cases to teach the fundamentals of law stems from the fact 
that large portions oflegal opinions have nothing to do with the doc-
trinal fundamentals: much writing is devoted to a recitation of the 
facts of the case, to handling of the make-weight arguments ad-
vanced by the parties, and to the procedural problems endemic to 
every case. A concomitant problem is the general length of legal 
opinions, about which I dare not cast the first stone. 7 It becomes a 
real specialty for teachers and textbook writers to try to cut an opin-
ion to manageable size without also cutting out much of what makes 
it worth annotating. Nowhere do the authors show their art better 
than in their encapsulation of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer. 8 In ten pages they capture the meat and the conclusions that 
took the Supreme Court 132 pages to deliver in the first place. (Jus-
tice Linde had an advantage on that case, however: he was Justice 
Douglas's law clerk at the time.) 
Justice Linde enjoys other privileges not normally given to text-
book authors. After many years of distinguished teaching at the 
University of Oregon, Professor Linde became Justice Linde - a 
6. There is a volume, not much shorter than Legislative and Administrative Processes, that 
deals only with some efforts at reform of the legislative process in one state, Illinois. See 
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IMPROVING THE 
STATE LEGISLATURE (1967), 
7. There is a recent article pleading for a reduction in the length of judicial opinions; I 
regard it as required reading, both for me and for my clerks. Gardner, Toward Shorter Opin-
ions, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 240 (1980). 
8. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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member of the Supreme Court of Oregon. One of the Oregon cases 
covered in the first edition was Board of Medical Examiners v. 
Mintz .9 In Mintz, the Oregon Supreme Court said that the State 
Board of Medical Examiners did not need to establish rules and reg-
ulations before revoking the medical license of a doctor charged with 
performing an abortion. The authors asked some piercing questions 
about the ratio decidendi of the Mintz decision, indicating a mini-
mum of enthusiasm for the holding. 
Mintz was covered in the second edition as well, but lo and be-
hold! - after the discussion of Mintz, there appears the precis of 
another case before the Oregon Supreme Court. In Megdal v. Ore-
gon State Board of Dental Examiners, 10 "Linde J." ruled that the 
dental board did have to establish some rules and definitions before 
it could revoke the petitioner's license. What a glaring case of aca-
demic activism! 
Dispassionate history seldom is written by its actors. Because I 
was a member of Congress during the relevant periods, the following 
comments must be taken with several grains of salt. I think that the 
congressional reforms and changes that occurred in the 1970s will 
have a substantial and lasting impact on the institution. Everything 
from the anti-impoundment statute, to th.e statute setting up the 
House and Senate budget committees, to the House rule changes 
making it easier to get rid of committee chairmen, to the recordation 
of votes on amendments and, perhaps most importantly, to the vari-
ous sunshine proposals that opened up committee hearings and 
markups to the press and public - all of these significantly altered 
how legislation is made. 11 While Legislative and Administrative 
Processes does contain references to specific changes in the budget-
ing process, there is not very much about the rest of the reforms. 
Even more notable is the absence of discussion of the political and 
social forces that bring about changes in the legislative process, ei-
ther the ones that occurred in the 1970s or any of the earlier reform 
movements in the Congress or the state legislatures. Parochial in-
volvement aside, I think the substance of those changes, and the 
political and social ferment that caused them, are very much a part 
of understanding the process. No one can expect a single casebook 
or a single course to provide an adequate explanation of the legisla-
9. 233 Or. 441, 378 P.2d 945 (1963). 
10. 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). 
11. Internal reform efforts in Congress have been the subject of numerous articles. See, 
e.g., Hopkins & Oleszek, Ninety-F!fth Congress: Legislative Reform in 1977, 64 A.B.A.J. 341 
(1978). See generally LEGISLATIVE REFORM (L. Rieselbach ed. 1978). 
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tive process to budding lawyers, but they should at least be taught to 
suspect that there is an interaction between the process and national 
moods, that elections do change the way things get done, and that 
one cannot even find out where they sell legislative scorecards or 
where the game is played if there is no awareness of the complex 
interactions between the people and their representatives. 
The above is not a pep talk designed to lead all law students to 
contemplate a political career, although that is not such a bad idea. 
Nor is it an argument for teaching more political science in the law 
schools. Rather, it is an enlargement of the plea made above for law 
schools to teach lawyers how to think about the legislative process. 
The range of my comments about the book should make it clear 
that I really wish the authors had written three or four books -
separating out the legislative and administrative processes as well as 
the federal and state forums. It should be equally obvious that the 
complaint starts from the premise that the authors possess the requi-
site skill to produce books worth teaching with and reading. When 
all is said and done, law book writers do not create their material. 
Their genius is in finding (and shortening) the right cases to stimu-
late discussion and thought about the broad principles of the law, in 
excerpting the apt comments from the vast literature about those 
cases and the law in general, in studding the text with pertinent and 
impertinent questions and comments about the materials being 
presented. Casebook writers are really collectors first and annotators 
second - and the test is whether the collection and annotations can 
tantalize lawyers-to-be so that they embark on a lifelong search for 
answers to the hard questions. 
It is on this account that Justice Linde, Professor Bunn, and their 
collaborators deserve high praise for the second edition of their 
casebook on Legislative and Administrative Processes. If there is to 
be any adjustment in the present imbalance between the teaching of 
how the common law was made and how the everyday,_ here-and-
now statutory law is made, it will be accomplished through books 
such as this one. 
